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Abstract
We reported the  results from a  simple experiment where participants (n = 646) picked their 
preferred winter holiday from three possible alternatives. To make the  experiment as realistic 
as possible, the  alternatives among which participants could choose, were very similar to actual 
winter holidays offered by an existing travel agency. Our results are consistent with predictions 
made by prospect theory:  alternatives that compare favorably to a  reference option are chosen 
more often than alternatives that compare unfavorably to a reference option. The reference option, 
experimentally manipulated in this paper, was one of the three alternatives available to participants. 
Including different reference alternatives into the available choice set changed relative preferences 
over the  remaining alternatives. Our findings provide further evidence that prospect theory can 
have practical implications for marketers who can influence consumer choice by merely presenting 
specially composed sets of alternatives.
Keywords: prospect theory, reference point, loss aversion, preference shifts, marketing
INTRODUCTION
One of the  main assumptions of the  theory of 
rational choice is that the  decision maker has 
consistent preferences (see e.g. Luce, 1959, 1977). For 
example, alternative A is always (say) better than B, 
irrespective of whether there is also a C alternative 
or whether there are just the A and B alternatives.
Conversely, when the  assumption of consistent 
preferences is violated, alternative A can be seen as 
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(say) better than B under certain circumstances, while 
alternative A can be seen as worse than B under 
different circumstances. The change in circumstances 
can have the  form of, for example, broadening 
the  choice set and / or changing the  reference point 
against which the alternatives are evaluated (see e.g. 
Highhouse, 1996; Herne, 1997).
In the present study we offer new evidence that 
given different choice sets the preferences / choices 
of people are indeed different, which is considered 
irrational by (neo)classical economic theory.
Over the years, evidence of preference reversals 
has accumulated steadily (beginning with 
Lichtenstein  nd  Slovic, 1971 and Lindman, 1971; 
see also e.g. Kahneman  et  al., 1990; Highhouse, 
1996; Seidl, 2002; Bonaccio and Reeve, 2006; 
Loomes et al., 2010). However, the extent to which 
such reversals of preferences are generalizable 
to different decision domains / scenarios is worth 
investigating (e.g. Ball, 2012).
The choices of participants in our study are 
consistent with the  occurrence of preference 
reversals. More specifically, their choices can be 
explained by changing reference states and by 
loss aversion as described in prospect theory (see 
the next section for more details).
Prospect theory has been often used to explain 
decision making under risk. There are relatively 
fewer studies that apply this theory to riskless 
decision making (e.g. Kahneman  et  al., 1990; 
Highhouse, 1996; Wong and Kwong, 2005; Bonaccio 
and Reeve, 2006; Huber  et  al., 2008). As far as we 
know, there are no studies similar to ours in that they 
test whether prospect theory can explain riskless 
choice in decision tasks based on real offers from an 
actual company (although Bonaccio and Reeve, 2006 
also use quite realistic decision scenarios).
Since we have used quasi‑real‑life decision 
tasks, our results might also have implications for 
marketing practitioners. By changing the available 
choice set of offers, marketers may have the ability 
to influence the choices of potential customers.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Expected utility theory
In (neo)classical economics, the  decision 
maker is seen as a  rational agent who strives to 
obtain the  highest possible utility from his choice 
of alternatives, so‑called homo oeconomicus. 
The  standard model of such rational decision 
making is the Expected Utility Theory (EUT). EUT is 
accepted as a  normative model of rational choice 
and it is often applied as a  descriptive model of 
economic behavior. Important for the present study 
is the axiom in EUT that the reversal of preferences 
is not allowed. This means that the decision maker 
makes consistent comparisons among alternatives 
(see e.g. Luce, 1959; 1977; Jehle  and  Reny, 2001).
Even though the  EUT is agreed to be the  basic 
economic theory of choice, numerous critiques of 
this neoclassical model exist. Prospect theory (PT) 
represents the main challenger of EUT.
Prospect theory
Prospect theory (PT) is a  behavioral 
economic theory that describes judgment and 
decision‑making processes when choosing between 
alternatives that usually involve risk. According to 
PT, decision‑makers can show “irrational” reversal 
in their preferences as the  context changes (e.g., 
Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman  et  al., 1990; Kahneman 








1: An illustrative utility function f concave for gains and convex (and steeper) for losses
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can prefer alternative A over alternative B in one 
context, but they can prefer B over A in another 
context.
In PT, the value function represents the subjective 
value one assigns to outcomes. Kahneman  and 
Tversky (1979, 1991) propose that EUT’s utility 
function should be replaced with an S‑shaped 
value function (see Fig. 1) which: 
a) is defined over gains and losses relative to 
a  reference point (e.g. The  intersection of axes 
P in Fig. 1);
b) is concave in the domain of gains and convex in 
the domain of losses. This indicates that people 
are less willing to gamble with profits than with 
losses;
c) is steeper for losses than for gains  –  which is 
called loss aversion. Loss aversion expresses 
that the  response to losses is greater than 
the response to gains (Kahneman  and  Tversky, 
1979). The displeasure associated with a loss of 
one unit of X (e.g. some valuable product) can be 
counterbalanced with a gain of approximately 
2.2 units of X.
Prospect theory of riskless choice
pT mainly deals with decision making under 
risk (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
and  Kahneman, 1992). However, as an extension 
of choice under conditions of risk, Tversky  and 
Kahneman (1991) propose the application of PT in 
decision making under certainty. Decision making 
under certainty (also called “riskless” decision 
making) concerns choices between options 
where the  outcomes are known and specific (i.e., 
the probability of obtaining the selected alternative 
is equal to 1). This extension of PT represents 
the immediate theoretical basis of this study.
Similarly to risky situations, PT in riskless choice 
operates with a  value function that is S‑shaped 
and asymmetric and has the  same three major 
properties as described above in case of the value 
function in risky choice:  a) reference dependence 
(consumption bundles are viewed as gains and 
losses relative to a reference point), b) diminishing 
sensitivity (the  marginal value of losses and 
gains decreases with their size), c) loss aversion 
(losses loom larger than corresponding gains). 
Consequently, the value function for riskless choice 
has the same shape as function f in Fig. 1 above.
Let us now have a look at how two properties of 
the  value function  –  loss aversion and reference 
dependence  –  affect riskless choice according to 
PT. PT’s two intuitions about the  riskless choice 
that are crucial for the  present paper can be 
briefly summarized as follows:  1) Disadvantages 
of alternatives are more salient, i.e. they have 
greater weight in the  decision process, than their 
advantages. 2) Advantages and disadvantages 
of alternatives are always evaluated relative to 
a reference point. By changing the reference point, 
the perceived utility of alternatives can be changed 
(Kahneman  and  Tversky, 1991).
Fig. 2 illustrates these two intuitions. The decision 
maker should choose between options A and B. 
Each option is characterized by two valuable 
qualities p and q (a marginal increase in either 
p or q is equally valuable to the decision maker).
2: Evaluation of two options from different reference points
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In Fig. 2, points A and B represent the alternatives, 
points R0, R1, R2 are different reference points.
When evaluated from R1, option A represents 
a  two‑unit improvement (an “advantage” or 
a  “gain”, i.e. an outcome above the  reference 
state) in quality p compared to R1, and A is as 
good as R1 in quality q. When evaluated from R1, 
option B represents a  one‑unit deterioration (a 
“disadvantage” or a  “loss”, i.e. an outcome below 
the reference state) in quality p compared to R1, and 
a  three‑unit improvement in quality q compared 
to R1. Because “disadvantages” (or “losses”) are 
more salient than “advantages”, when evaluated 
from R1, option A should be preferred over option 
B according to PT. This reasoning is based on 
Kahneman and Tversky (1991).
Conversely, it is easy to see that when evaluated 
from the  standpoint of R2, option B should be 
preferred to option A.  –  There is a  two‑unit 
improvement in quality q when B is evaluated 
from reference point R2. There is a  one unit 
deterioration in quality q when A is evaluated from 
reference point R2, and this deterioration is not 
sufficiently compensated (due to loss aversion) by 
the three‑unit improvement in quality p when one 
compares A and R2.
Finally, when evaluated from R0, A and B have 
the same value for the decision maker. – A is better 
than R0 in quality p but worse in quality q, B is 
better than R0 in quality q but worse in quality p).
To summarize, the  choice between the  two 
options, A and B, is affected by the  position 
of reference point they are evaluated from. 
From different reference points, the  options 
are evaluated as differently advantageous or 
disadvantageous relative to the  given reference 
point. And because of loss aversion advantages of 
options are perceived as less important than their 
disadvantages. The  combined effect of changed 
reference points and of loss aversions can lead to 
reversed preferences as illustrated in Fig.  2 (see 
also Kahneman and Tversky, 1991).
We hypothesize that a shift of the reference point 
will cause a change of preferences for a service (a 
winter holiday, in the  present case). Thus, testing 
our hypothesis enables us to test whether decision 
makers behave “rationally” or “irrationally” 
(bounded rationally) in the  quasi‑real‑life context 
under study.
Related research on riskless choice
A number of experiments show that reference 
states and loss aversion affect preferences in 
riskless choice (e.g. Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988; Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman  et  al., 1990). 
In these experiments the  status quo (e.g. being 
endowed with a  particular product) serves as 
the reference state. The results of these experiments 
show that people are less willing to sell products 
they were endowed with than they are willing to 
pay for (identical) products they do not currently 
possess.
While our experiment points in the  same 
direction as these recent experiments, it is not 
the  status quo which serves as the  reference 
point in our study, but rather, one of the available 
alternatives. Kahneman  and  Tversky (1991) note 
that a reference state can be the decision maker’s 
current position, but that it can be also influenced 
by aspirations, norms, (social) comparisons 
(Fox and Dayan, 2004; Huber  et  al., 2008), and 
expectations (Köszegi and Rabin, 2006; Knetsch 
and Wong, 2009). In our study we assume that 
when an alternative is listed among the available 
options, it serves as a  reference point (because it 
is by looking at the  possible options that one can 
form their expectations).
Our experiment is methodologically very similar 
to Highhouse (1996). Participants in his study 
made a  (hypothetical) choice from a  choice set 
of three job candidates A, B, C. Highhouse used 
a  between‑subjects design with two groups of 
subjects. Two candidates (A and B) were included 
in the  choice set in both experimental groups. 
The  third “decoy” (or “reference”, as we would 
say) candidate was different (C1, C2) in each 
experimental group.
In the  first choice set in Highhouse (1996), 
candidate A was equally good as C1 in quality q1 
and slightly better in quality p; candidate B was 
worse than C1 in quality q and considerably better 
in quality p. In the second choice set, candidate B 
was equally good as C2 in quality p and slightly 
better in quality q; candidate A was worse than 
C2 in quality p and considerably better in quality 
q. Notice that these comparisons have the  same 
structure as the  comparisons illustrated in Fig.  2 
above.
1 Candidate A is called Martin in Highhouse’s article and quality q is “promotability”.
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Because in the  first choice set, loss aversion 
(in comparison with the  reference candidate C1) 
was triggered in the  case of candidate B but not 
candidate A, PT predicts that candidate A will be 
picked more often. Similarly, because in the second 
choice set, loss aversion (in comparison with 
the  reference candidate C2) was triggered in case 
of candidate B but not candidate A, PT predicts 
that candidate A will be picked more often. 
Indeed, choices of candidate A over candidate B 
were significantly more prevalent in the  second 
choice set in Highhouse (1996), thus supporting 
PT (for similar studies with comparable results see 
Slaughter et al., 1999; Slaughter, 2007).
Similar results in a different context are reported 
by Bonaccio and Reeve (2006). In their study 
participants picked preferred options (jobs, plane 
tickets, parking permits and video cameras) in 
decision tasks with a  similar structure as used 
in Highhouse (1996). Again, in line with PT’s 
predictions, participants had a  tendency to prefer 
alternatives that were slightly better in one respect 
than a  reference alternative and equally good in 
another respect as the  reference alternative over 
alternatives that were considerably better in one 
respect than the reference alternative but worse in 
another respect than the reference alternative.
MATERIALS AND METHOD
Participants
Based on the two reference points, two versions 
of questionnaire – A and B – were constructed to be 
compared to each other. Both survey questionnaires 
were divided into two parts:  resort issues and 
demographics issues. Each of the  questionnaires 
contains three questions about preferences 
among destinations offered with an additional 
question about the  decision weight of the  four 
factors (price including accommodation, ski pass 
and transportation costs, ski slope kilometers, 
the distance from accommodation to ski slopes and 
the  distance from the  Czech Republic to the  final 
destination. The questionnaires included questions 
such as gender, age and profession. Regrettably, 
the overwhelming majority did not fill this data so 
we did not add an additional survey to our findings 
so we restricted our respondents simply to both 
groups of ski devoted individuals.
A total of 646 participants completed an online 
survey. The  participants were divided into two 
groups, Group A (n = 332) and Group B (n = 314). 
In the  group A which were internet respondents, 
four hundred twenty‑six people were contacted via 
email and internet site http: // www.vyplnto.cz, out 
of which 332 responses were collected (78 percent 
response rate for the A questionnaire). The group B 
was selected from the PUXtravel contacts database 
and was sent the  link to the online survey. Out of 
a  random sample of 1500 PUXtravel customers 
surveyed, 314 participated in the survey (21 percent 
response rate).  Participants in Group A indicated 
their preferences in two decision tasks 1a, 2a (see 
below), participants in Group B indicated their 
preferences in two remaining decision tasks 1b, 
2b (see below)  –  i.e., we used a  between‑subjects 
design. 
Design of the decision tasks and predictions
Our hypothesis is that the  shift of the  reference 
point will cause a  change of preferences for 
a  service, namely a  winter holiday. To test this 
hypothesis we created two sets of decision tasks 
and the  choices in these two sets of tasks were 
compared.
In Tab. I we present the four decision tasks that 
were included in the  survey. In all decision tasks 
the participant had to select his or her preferred ski 
tour among three alternatives (the alternatives are 
named after the names of the respective hotels).
The four dimensions used in the  descriptions 
of options are:  the  price of the  ski tour, ski slope 
kilometers, the  distance from accommodation 
to the  ski slope, and the  distance from the  Czech 
Republic to the  final destination. As can be seen 
in Tab. I, in some cases precise information about 
the  options was given, sometimes, however, 
the  provided information was approximate only 
(i.e. a  range of numerical values was given). 
The approximate values were used to ensure that 
all the options were perceived as equivalent with 
respect to the  dimension where the  approximate 
specification was used.
To test our hypothesis, we compared the choices 
in Task 1a vs. Task 1b; and in Task 2a vs. Task 2b, as 
described below.
Notice that when you look at these pairs of 
tasks in Tab.  I (e.g. Task 1a and Task 1b), there 
are two options that are available in both tasks in 
a given pair (e.g. option “Steuer” and option “Foret 
Blanche” in Tasks 1a and 1b). The  third option in 
a  task is always different across the  paired task 
(for example, in Tasks 1a and 1b, the third option 
is “Musik” and “Antares”, respectively). This third 
option serves as the reference point2 .
2 Note, however, that the three available options were presented to the respondents in the same manner.
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Let us first briefly compare the  two options 
available in a  given task, ignoring the  third 
“reference” option. In all cases, the  two options 
are identical with respect to two variables (e.g. 
“Ski slopes” and “Distance to ski slope” in Tasks 
1a / 1b) and such variables can be ignored in 
the comparisons. In all cases, one option in a given 
Task exceeds the  other option in one attribute 
and, conversely, is worse than the  other option in 
another attribute. Namely, in Tasks 1a / 1b, Steuer is 
worse with respect to “Price” than Foret Blanche, 
but it is better with respect to “Distance from CZ”. In 
Tasks 2a / 2b, Promberg is worse with respect to “Ski 
slopes” than Croisette, but it is better with respect to 
“Distance from CZ”.
Now, how does introducing the  third option 
(the  “reference” option) affect the  comparison 
between the  first two options? This is the  key 
question for the present research.
Let us first consider the  situation in Tasks 1a 
and 1b.
In Task 1a, Option 1 (Steuer) is better than 
the reference Option (Musik) with respect to “Price”, 
and it is the  same as the  reference Option with 
respect to “Distance from CZ”. Again in Task 1a, 
Option 2 (Foret Blanche) is better than the reference 
Option (Musik) with respect to “Price”, and it is 
worse than the  reference Option with respect to 
“Distance from CZ”.
In Task 1b, Option 1 (Steuer) is better than 
the  reference Option (Antares) with respect 
to “Distance from CZ”, and it is the  same as 
the reference Option with respect to “Price”. Again 
in Task 1b, Option 2 (Foret Blanche) is better than 
the  reference Option (Antares) with respect to 
“Price” and it is the  same as the  reference Option 
with respect to “Distance from CZ”.
According to PT, the introduction of the reference 
Option Musik in Task 1a should trigger loss aversion 
when the reference point is compared with Option 
2 (Foret Blanche). The introduction of the reference 
Option Antares in Task 1b does not trigger any loss 
aversion when compared to either Option 1 (Steuer) 
or Option 2 (Foret Blanche). Thus, PT’s prediction 
is that Option 2 (Foret Blanche) will be chosen 
less frequently in Task 1a (where loss aversion is 
triggered) than in Task 1b, compared to Option 1 
(Steuer)3.
The comparisons and theoretical predictions from 
the  previous three paragraphs are summarized 
in Tab.  II, along with similar comparisons and 
predictions for Tasks 2a / 2b. As can be seen in 
Tab.  II, in case of Tasks 2a / 2b loss aversion is 
triggered only for Option 2 in Task 2a, therefore 
I: Decision tasks used in the study
Task Option Price (CZK) Ski slope (km)
Distance to ski 
slope (km)




Steuer (O1) 11810 100 – 200 0.5 Close (A)
Foret Blanche (O2) 9580 100 – 200 0.5 Distant (F)
Musik (RO) 12300 100 – 200 0.5 Close (A)
Task 2a
Promberg (O1) 10130 – 11800 130 3 Close (A)
Croisette (O2) 10130 – 11800 160 3 Distant (F)
Planger (RO) 10130 – 11800 48 3 Close (A)
Task 1b
Steuer (O1) 11810 100‑200 0.5 Close (A)
Foret Blanche (O2) 9580 100‑200 0.5 Distant (F)
Antares (RO) 11810 100‑200 0.5 Distant (F)
Task 2b
Promberg (O1) 10130 – 11800 130 3 Close (A)
Croisette (O2) 10130 – 11800 160 3 Distant (F)
La Combe d’Or (RO) 10130 – 11800 88 3 Distant (F)
Note 1: In the “Option” column O1 stands for Option 1, O2 stands for Option 2 and RO stands for reference option. 
Note 2: In both questionnaires related to respondent groups A and B the first multiple questions corresponding to three 
different ski resorts were the slope length specified by the comment: For all resorts hold: medium‑sized ski resort (ski 
slopes 100‑200 km); the distance from accommodation to ski slope to 500 meters. The spread of ski slope length was 
difficult to specify more in details due to considerable variability of this parameter done by various possibilities of 
ropeways use.      
3 More precisely, the ratio “choices of Steuer (i.e. Option 1)” : “choices of Foret Blanche (i.e. Option 2)” is predicted to be 
higher in Task 1a than in Task 1b.
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PT predicts that Option 1 (Promberg) will be 
chosen more frequently in Task 2a than in Task 2b, 
compared to Option 2 (Croisette)4.
Note: 0 in the “Comparison” columns means that 
the  respective Option and its reference option are 
the same with respect to a given variable, + means 
that the  Option is better than the  reference 
option,  ‑  means that the  Option is worse than 
the reference option.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Tab. III gives the number of participants choosing 
a given Option in a given Task.
As for Task 1, according to PT, Option 2 (Foret 
Blanche) is “handicapped” by loss aversion due to 
its comparison to the  reference option (Musik) in 
Task 1a, but not in Task 1b (where the  reference 
option is Antares, see Tab. II).
This “handicap” is predicted to make Option 2 less 
popular compared to Option 1 as we move from 
Task 1b to Task 1a. This is indeed what we observe. 
The ratio of choosing Option 2 to choose Option 1 is 
177: 130 in Task 1a, while it increases to 214: 62 in 
Task 1b (see Tab. III).
We used multinomial logistic regression to 
analyze these differences (Wang R. 2018, Li H. 2011 
and Li G. 2015), results can be found in Tab.  IV. 
Option 2 (Foret Blanche) has exp(0.9302) ≐ 2.54 
times higher odds of being picked over Option 1 
(Steuer) in Task 1b than in Task 1a5. This difference 
is significant at p < .001.
4 More precisely, the ratio “choices of Promberg (i.e. Option 1)” : “choices of Croisette (i.e. Option 2)” is predicted to be 
higher in Task 2a than in Task 2b.
5 The third value of the dependent variable is choosing neither Option 1, nor Option 2.
II: Comparisons of options with different reference points, and the corresponding PT’s predictions
Task Option
Comparison of the Option with the reference 
point used in the Task with respect to: Loss aversion 
triggered for 
the Option?




Option 1 + 0 0 0 No
Option 2 + 0 0 ‑ Yes
Task 1b
Option 1 0 0 0 + No
Option 2 + 0 0 0 No
Task 2a
Option 1 0 + 0 0 No
Option 2 0 + 0 ‑ Yes
Task 2b
Option 1 0 + 0 + No
Option 2 0 + 0 0 No
III: Number of participants choosing individual Options
Task Option Participants choosing that option
Task 1a
Option 1 (Steuer) 130 (39.2 % of Group A)
Option 2 (Foret Blanche) 177 (53.3 % of Group A)
Option 3 (Musik) 25 (7.5 % of Group A)
Task 1b
Option 1 (Steuer) 62 (19.7 % of Group B)
Option 2 (Foret Blanche) 214 (68.2 % of Group B)
Option 3 (Antares) 38 (12.1 % of Group)
Task 2a
Option 1 (Promberg) 112 (33.7 % of Group A)
Option 2 (Croisette) 167 (50.3 % of Group A)
Option 3 (Planger) 53 (16.0 % of Group A)
Task 2b
Option 1 (Promberg) 62 (19.7 % of Group B)
Option 2 (Croisette) 236 (75.2 % of Group B)
Option 3 (La Combe d’Or) 16 (5.1 % of Group B)
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A similar comparison can be made in the  case 
of Task  2. Once again, Option 2 (Croisette) is 
handicapped by loss aversion due to its comparison 
to the reference option (Planger) in Task 2a, but not 
in Task 2b (where the reference option is La Combe 
d’Or, see Tab. II). According to PT, Option 2 should, 
therefore, become less popular when compared 
to Option 1 as we move from Task 2b to Task 2a. 
Our data again support this prediction. The ratio of 
choosing Option 2 to choose Option 1 is 167: 112 in 
Task 2a, while it increases to 236 :  62 in Task 2b 
(see Tab. III).
Multinomial logistic regression shows that Option 
2 (Croisette) has exp(0.9372) ≐ 2.55 times higher 
odds of being picked over Option 1 (Promberg) 
in Task 2b than in Task 2a6. This difference is 
significant at p < .001.
To summarize, the  results show that including 
different reference options in the  choice set 
influences riskless choice between the  other 
options in the choice set. Moreover, the decisions 
are affected in the  direction predicted by loss 
aversion  –  specifically, alternatives that compare 
unfavorably to a reference option are chosen less 
often than alternatives that compare favorably 
to a  reference option. In addition, in both tasks 
the  effect of loss aversion causes approximately 
255 % increase in odds of picking Option 2 over 
Option 1.
Our findings are in line with previous findings 
that show the effect of loss aversion and changing 
reference points on riskless choice (such as 
Kahneman et al., 1990; Highhouse, 1996; Bonaccio 
and Reeve, 2006; Slaughter, 2007). We demonstrate 
further generalizability of the effect of loss aversion 
and reference dependence.
Much of the  previous research on riskless 
choice employed relatively simple (and often 
“artificial”) decision tasks stripped of any 
unnecessary features. This approach enhances 
internal validity through more rigorous control 
over the  experimental situation, but it makes 
the generalizability of the findings to the “outside” 
world problematic. In our view, simple theory 
testing (for which rigorous experimental control, 
albeit in an abstracted environment, is critical) is 
currently less interesting in the  case of PT than 
evaluating PT’s generalizability to various decision 
contexts and to the field.
We base our decision tasks on real offers of 
winter holidays from an actual travel agency. 
In many respects, the  decisions made in these 
tasks are very similar to actual decisions made 
by people when purchasing a  winter holiday. 
The  quasi‑real‑life character of the  decision 
tasks we employ is a  strong suit of the  present 
research. Our approach goes hand in hand 
with a  more general tendency in experimental 
economics to pay greater attention to ecological 
validity and to gather field or at least field‑like 
data (see e.g. List, 2006; Levitt and List, 2007; 
Ball et al., 2012).
From a marketer’s perspective, we can conclude 
that the  use of certain principles of PT (loss 
aversion and reference dependence) in how 
the  set of offered options is composed can affect 
customer’s choice.
In the  real marketplace there is usually an 
abundance of (often only partially visible) 
reference points, which renders analysis of 
choices in the  field difficult. Therefore, our 
data are not collected from a  real marketplace, 
but from a  hypothetical choice experiment. 
However, there is in fact no indication that it 
is the  hypothetical nature of the  decisions that 
underlie our results.
IV: Results of multinomial logistic regression model 
Task Coefficient Estimate Std. Error z value p‑value
Task 1
Intercept 0.2086 0.1155 2.672 0.00754
Loss Aversion 0.9302 0.1848 5.034 4.8·10‑7
Task 2
Intercept 0.3995 0.1221 3.271 0.00107
Loss Aversion 0.9372 0.1878 4.989 6.06·10‑7
6 The third value of the dependent variable is choosing neither Option 1, nor Option 2.
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CONCLUSION
This paper has explored the effect of loss aversion and changes of reference points in a hypothetical 
choice experiment in microeconomic consumption behavior. We confirm that people tend to prefer 
alternatives that do not compare unfavorably to other options in the choice set (i.e. people are loss 
averse). We also confirm that the  evaluation of alternatives is reference dependent:  by adding 
different alternatives to a choice set the relative (mutual) attractiveness of the remaining alternatives 
can be reversed (e.g., A is chosen over B in a choice set including C1, but B is chosen over A in a choice 
set including C2).
The choice tasks we employed were based on real offers from an actual travel agency. This enhances 
the external validity of our findings that in general the role of the reference point and loss aversion 
has a  significant impact on the  consumer’s behavior. Thus, our results suggest the  possibility 
of a  relatively simple and practical application of prospect theoretical principles in marketing 
campaigns. We expect that our findings might be added to a growing body of literature on using 
the prospect theory for understanding and predicting consumer’s behavior.
However, with small sample size, caution must be applied, as the findings might not be transferable 
to all conditions. Another significant limitation that needs to be considered is the survey method 
used. The results are not captured from the real marketplace; the only likely choice was made. When 
making an actual decision, the respondents might act differently than stated in the questionnaire. 
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